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I. INTRODUCTION
How powerful are courts in the making of public policy? Sorting out
the relative power of courts in a system of shared powers is not easy.
Judging the power within the judicial hierarchy is similarly difficult. It
is not easy to tell when a court's decisions (or the actions of any political
actor) are decisive, that is, when they are necessary and sufficient for
changing or blocking policy, and when they are not. One way that
scholars have sought to untangle the threads of causality is through in-
depth case studies as to how policy has changed over decades, trying to
find the smoking gun behind any change in policy.
In this Article, we present an alternative way to sort out the issue of
decisiveness. We do not analyze policy effects directly. Rather, we use
the event study approach, testing policy impact by showing significant
changes in the prices of politically sensitive stocks immediately
following agency and court decisions. This is a well-known and well-
developed methodology in the finance literature, but one perhaps
underused within political science' (despite being a natural application
1. In the finance/economics literature, it has been applied to everything from
merger regulations to hurricanes. See Katherine Schipper & Rex Thompson, The Impact
of Merger-Related Regulations on the Shareholders of Acquiring Firms, 21 J. ACCT. RES.
184 (1983); Lazarus A. Angbazo & Ranga Narayanan, Catastrophic Shocks in the
Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Evidence on Regulatory and Contagion Effects,
63 J. RISK & INS. 619 (1996). Brian E. Roberts, A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority
and the Distribution of Federal Benefits, 34 AM. J. POL. Sci. 31 (1990) [herinafter
Roberts, A Dead Senator Tells No Lies]. Within the political science literature, we are
aware of only a few applications, despite some notable successes: on the death of
Senator Jackson, on the 1980 election, on legislative rules and energy tax legislation, on
the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act, on the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, and
on the 1992 presidential election. Brian E. Roberts, Political Institutions, Policy
Expectations, and the 1980 Election: A Financial Market Perspective, 34 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 289 (1990) [hereinafter Roberts, Political Institutions]; Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith
Krehbiel, Complex Rules and Congressional Outcomes: An Event Study of Energy Tax
Legislation, 50 J. POLITICS 625 (1988); Thomas W. Gilligan, William J. Marshall, &
Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Short-Haul Pricing Constraint, 21 RAND J.
ECoN. 189 (1990); Karen R. Schnietz, The Reaction of Private Interests to the 1934
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 57 INT'L ORG. 213 (2003); Michael C. Herron et al.,
Measurement of Political Effects in the United States Economy: A Study of the 1992
Presidential Election, 11 ECON. & POL. 51 (1999). Event studies not yet published
include a dissertation on party control of Congress, one on the 1996 congressional
elections, and one on the value of judicial independence in 1988. See Brian E. Roberts,
The Redistributive Consequences of Changing Majority Control in the U.S. House of
Representatives (Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
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of standard research designs 2). We extend this approach to study the
relative impact of court decisions within public policymaking.
Our case study is the attempt by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to regulate tobacco products and tobacco advertising in the 1990s
after eight decades of public denials of such jurisdiction (by the FDA
itself, the Surgeon General, and others) and despite a lack of clear intent
by Congress to delegate such jurisdiction to the FDA.3 The courts struck
this down, but with Congress lurking in the background, it is difficult to
tell whether these court decisions were truly decisive, or whether this
policy initiative was going to die on the Hill anyway. If Congress or the
President would have blocked regulation in the end, then the court
decisions cannot be said to have been truly decisive. It can also be
difficult to allocate causal impact between the judges and courts that
handled the case. The basic question is how much control individual
Association (Apr. 27-30, 2000)) (on file with author) [hereinafter Roberts, Redistributive
Consequences]; Daniel M. Klerman & Paul Mahoney, The Value of Judicial
Independence: Evidence from 18th Century England (The University of Virginia Law School
& Economics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 03-12; The University of Southern
California Law School Law & Public Policy Research Paper Series, Paper No. 04-2; The
University of Southern California Law School & Economics Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 04-2, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3papers.cfm?abstract
id=495642. Nathan W. Monroe, Partisan Dividends: Event Studies of Political Change
(May 3, 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego) (on
file with author). Some event studies have looked at court decisions (though again not
in the political science literature), specifically at the 1951 Schwegmann decision
(finding little evidence of significant effects) and at antitrust litigation and the computer
industry (finding significant effects). See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U.S. 384 (1951); Philip L. Hersch, The Effects of Resale Price Maintenance on
Shareholder Wealth: The Consequences of Schwegmann, 62 J. INDUS. ECON. 205 (1994);
William L. Huth & Don N. McDonald, The Impact of Antitrust Litigation on Shareholder
Wealth, 37 J. INDUS. ECON. 411 (1989). This Article uses the event study approach to
investigate court battles over the attempts of the FDA to regulate tobacco.
2. Specifically, we are employing multiple single-group regression point
displacement tests. William M.K. Trochim, The Research Methods Knowledge Base,
(August 02, 2000), http://trochim.human.comell.edu/kb/index.htm. The pre-test is the
stock return preceding the event, the event is the treatment, and the post-test is the stock
return following the event.
3. Compare John E. Jevicky, FDA's Regulation of Tobacco Products: A Flagrant
Disregard of Congressional Intent, 24 N. Ky. L. REV. 535 (1997) (arguing that Congress
did not delegate tobacco regulation to the FDA), with James T. O'Reilly, Tobacco and
the Regulatory Earthquake: Why the FDA Will Prevail After the Smoke Clears, 24 N.
Ky. L. REV. 509 (1997) (arguing that Congress did delegate regulatory authority to the
FDA).
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judges themselves had over the probability that tobacco would ultimately
be regulated in this way.
Our hypothesis is simply that judges were indeed very powerful
players in this policy struggle, and that their decisions significantly
affected the chances of regulation. Obviously, their decisions blocked
regulation, but their decisions were only powerful if regulation would
have succeeded in the end, in the context of the latent power of Congress
to act. If Congress had been set to block regulation, then the court
decisions were actually irrelevant, despite appearances.
This is not a run-of-the-mill case in which to analyze court power.
The stakes were quite high, economically,4 politically,5 and socially.6
Moreover, while the stakes involved in this particular case are far greater
than in the average district court case, the power of the courts to interpret
statutes is a recurring and important one in our constitutional system.
In this Article, we show that court decisions significantly and
independently affected the probability that tobacco regulation would
pass or be blocked. We rule out presidential or executive dominance of
this policy area-if the president or the FDA were the one decisive actor
in tobacco regulation, we should not observe the results that we do. In
what follows, we briefly place our research question in context. In Part
III, we lay out the timeline of the FDA's attempt to regulate tobacco. In
4. The tobacco industry is hundreds of years old and predates the founding of the
U.S. itself. The publicly traded tobacco companies have a market capitalization of
approximately $150 billion (market capitalization measures the size of a security or set
of securities as the price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding). The tobacco
industry spent $6 billion on marketing alone in 1993. Cigarette sales total nearly S40
billion in the U.S. annually and U.S. companies are responsible for approximately 10%
of the world's tobacco exports. Anthony Ramirez, Advertising: Proposed Regulations
May Mean Trouble for Industries Hooked on Tobacco Marketing Dollars, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1995, at D6.
5. In 2000, tobacco lobbyist expenditures totaled more than $20 million (Phillip
Morris alone spent over $11 million) and campaign contributions totaled $8,610,638
($5,318,039 in soft money). Open Secrets Lobbying Database, http://www.opensecrets.
org/lobbyists.indusclient.asp?code=A02&year=2000 (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). The
largest contributors were Phillip Morris ($3,490,438), U.S. Tobacco ($1,621,652), R. J.
Reynolds ($1,026,427), and Brown and Williamson at ($1,000,782). Id. Elections-perhaps
even control of Congress--can be swung by the politics of tobacco (since 1994, 75% of
tobacco company campaign contributions went to Republican candidates). Open Secrets
Industry Totals: Tobacco, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?lnd=A02 (last
visited Apr. 5, 2006).
6. Tobacco regulation affects the lifestyle and health (not to mention the wallets)
of more than 45 million Americans on a day-to-day basis. Smoking is thought to cause
the premature death of hundreds of thousands of Americans each year, but one out of
every four Americans still smokes. Marc Kaufman, Smoking In U.S. Declines Sharply:
Cigarette Sales At a 54-Year Low, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at AO1.
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Part IV, we explain the methodology of event studies and their
application to studying judicial impact. In Part V, we discuss the key
events, our predictions, the data, and our results. Part VI discusses our
findings and Part VII concludes.
1I. JUDICIAL IMPACT
How powerful are courts relative to the other branches of government?
Two centuries ago, Alexander Hamilton labeled the judiciary the "least
dangerous branch," arguing it possessed neither "the purse nor the
sword."7 More recent analyses run the gamut from those that see judges
as policy-makers, unconstrained by the other branches or by legal
concepts or norms,8 to those that recognize constraints in the form of
"the law" and legal norms,9 to those who argue that judges and courts
have profoundly changed American law,'0 and to those that recognize
severe constraints on the abilities of courts to make policy.1'
According to a recent summary of the judicial impact literature ,I2
scholars of judicial impact "generally assume that judicial decisions
have an important impact on the political, the economic, and to some
extent the social structures of the nation;" little has been done to
measure impact; findings have been "contradictory;" and "claims of
extensive influence are quite controversial." Obviously there are
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
8. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); see generally HAROLD J. SPAETH &
JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999).
9. Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI.
1018 (1996). Howard Gillman, Separating the Wheat from the Chaff in the Supreme
Court Attitudinal Model, 13 LAW & CTS. 12 (2003), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/
lawcourts/pubs/newsletter/index.html; Jack Knight, Symposium: The Supreme Court and
the Attitudinal Model, 4 LAW & CTS. 5 (1994), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/
lawcourts/pubs/newsletter/index.html.
10. See generally MARTIN GARBUS, COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2002); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005).
11. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
12. See generally BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES:
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (2d ed. 1999).
exceptions.' 3  Still, there are relatively few empirical studies actually
testing the impact of courts on policy, and these have usually been
limited to Warren Court civil liberties cases. 14 One reason is that data
following court decisions are rare, and pre-decision data even rarer,
making it difficult or impossible to sort out causal impact directly.
There have thus emerged two competing pictures of court power, one
in which the courts lack important policymaking capacity and one in
which courts have considerable policymaking independence and capacity.15
At the same time, scholars have debated the relative power of courts and
Congress.' 6 Another group of scholars have studied the strategic interaction
between courts, Congress, and the President to explain how the different
branches interact.' 7
The largest problem faced by both arguments is the attribution of
causality. Event studies have an advantage in this regard, in that they
help to isolate causal impact very narrowly.' 8 So long as the policy can
be tied (even indirectly) to the profits of publicly traded firms, the event
study approach can be used to isolate the probabilistic policy impact of
an event. We can thus separate judicial impact from other events and
even differentiate between different stages of the judicial process.
13. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBEN, JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS
(1998) (prison reform); see generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY
EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994) (pay equity reform);
DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (2001) (school finance reform).
14. Bradley C. Canon, Courts and Policy. Compliance, Implementation, and
Impact, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 435 (John B. Gates &
Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
15. See generally Bradley C. Canon, The Supreme Court and Policy Reform: The
Hollow Hope Revisited, in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE
SOCIAL CHANGE (David A. Schultz ed., 1998).
16. See, e.g., Mario Bergara, Barak D. Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling
Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 247 (2003); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 8, at 312-56.
17. John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1990); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The Political Economy of
Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan,
12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1992); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive
Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the
Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 165 (1992).
18. The disadvantage is that they do not delve into other aspects of policy impact
such as smoking rates, health impact, etc. We thus present this methodology to stand in
conjunction with other forms of evidence as to policy impact.
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III. TOBACCO TIMELINE
The battle over tobacco regulation provides an excellent case study to
reconsider these conflicting pictures of court power over policy. 9 We now
present a brief account of this battle,2 ° from which we derive our list of
events to test. Interestingly, it even appeared to contemporaneous observers
that the tobacco market moved in response to some of these events.
On February 25, 1995, David Kessler, the head of the FDA, released a
letter announcing that the FDA was considering regulating tobacco, with
cigarettes designated as drug (nicotine) delivery devices. This letter had
been kept a secret, known to only to a select few until its release, and
was issued without clearance by the White House. Such regulation
violated the 80-year-old doctrine (previously reaffirmed by Kessler
himself) that the FDA did not have jurisdiction over cigarettes.
After much investigation, the FDA gave official notice of proposed
rule-making, now with the explicit approval of President Clinton. 21 The
new regulations included the categorization of nicotine as a drug, which
would give the FDA authority over the sale, distribution, and use of
tobacco products. Other proposals outlawed cigarette vending machines
and restricted advertising aimed at younger audiences.22 The big
tobacco companies and an advertising agency immediately filed suit in
federal district court to block tobacco regulation, on the grounds that the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) did not extend to
tobacco products.2 3
Meanwhile, many analysts speculated that the regulations would be
tied up in the courts for years and eventually blocked by Congress, while
19. Tobacco policy and the FDA might not fit under Rosenberg's narrow
definition of significant policy change, as this case only deals with the "functioning of a
single bureaucracy" (though this case would meet many of the other parts of the
definition). See ROSENBERG, supra note 11, at 4.
20. For a more detailed account, see, e.g., DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT:
A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001).
21. This followed upon weeks of reports that Clinton would let the FDA proceed.
See, e.g., Clinton to Unveil Today Plans for Regulating Tobacco Products, AFP-Extel
New Ltd. AFX News, Aug 10, 1995. To the extent that the proposal was anticipated, we
cannot measure impact using an event study, but until the actual announcement, doubts
remained and the details were unknown.
22. U.S. Advertising Industry to Sue FDA Over Plan to Restrict Tobacco Ads,
AFP-Extel News Ltd. AFX news, Aug. 10, 1995.
23. Coyne Beahm Joins Major Cigarette Manufacturers in Lawsuit Against the
FDA. PR Newswire Assoc., Aug 10, 1995.
congressional Democrats boldly announced that Republicans lacked the
support to block this new initiative.24 The success of the proposed
regulation was thus far from clear, but the courts were seen as a major
obstacle to the FDA's plans. President Clinton approved the new
regulations (61 FR 44396) on August 23, 1996, and they were issued on
August 28th, to begin taking effect exactly one year later.25
Arguments in the lawsuit, Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA,26 were held on
February 10, 1997 before Judge Osteen of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina, who was predicted by most observers
to be hostile to the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction.27 Instead, on April 25,
he shocked the tobacco industry-and market traders-by ruling that the
FDA could in fact regulate tobacco, although they could not regulate
tobacco advertising as proposed. 8 He held that there was no evidence
that Congress had intended to withhold authority over tobacco products
and that these products fit within the appropriate definitions of "drug"
and "device. ' 29 Tobacco company stock prices fell, losing nearly 5% of
their market capitalization, a one-day loss of over six billion dollars to
stock traders, trumping the 2% loss after the FDA's notice of regulation
(almost 2 billion dollars). Advertising stocks, meanwhile, gained in
value.
Both sides appealed their respective losses in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FDA.3° On August 11, 1997, oral arguments were held
in the Fourth Circuit before a panel consisting of Judges Michael,
Russell, and Hall. Judges Michael and Russell continuously undercut
the FDA's argument with frequent, hostile interruptions, leaving little
hope that either would vote to sustain the lower court's ruling.31 But, on
February 22, 1998, before he could sign the decision reversing the lower
court, Judge Russell died and the expected win for tobacco became less
certain, as the two remaining votes were split.32 This was bad news for
24. Another speculation was that Clinton would simply negotiate to drop the
regulations in exchange for voluntary curbs on advertising and vending-machine sales.
Id.
25. KESSLER, supra note 20, at 353.
26. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 966 F. Supp. 1374
(M.D.N.C. 1997).
27. Judge Osteen's family owned a tobacco farm, he had represented a tobacco
heir as a lawyer, and he had made previous decisions in favor of tobacco growers.
KESSLER, supra note 20, at 355.
28. KESSLER, supra note 20, at 358.
29. Id.
30. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153 F.3d 155
(4th Cir. 1998).
31. KESSLER, supra note 20, at 364-66.
32. Id. at 366.
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the tobacco industry (not to mention for Judge Russell), and the market
capitalization suffered a one-day loss of $1.8 billion.33 (It was also bad
news for advertising interests in that it raised the possibility of a reversal
of their previous victory.)
Initially, it was unclear as to whether Judge Russell's cases would be
reheard or decided by the remaining two judges, but new oral arguments
were scheduled for June 9, with Judge Widener as his replacement.34
The Department of Justice predicted that Widener would be unsympathetic
to the FDA cause, which turned out to be correct.35 On August 14, the
appellate panel reversed the district court ruling on tobacco and affirming
the decision as to advertising, holding that the FDA's interpretation of
its statutory jurisdiction could not stand, as Congress had intended to
reserve such jurisdiction.36  This decision had the added effect of
strengthening tobacco's hand in the ongoing settlement negotiations.
The FDA appealed for rehearing en banc, but this was denied on
November 10th.3 ' This was the last point at which major doubts remained
about the ultimate fate of tobacco regulation.
The FDA then appealed to the Supreme Court.38 Despite expectations
that the court would not take the case,39 the justices granted certiorari on
April 26, 1999, and held oral arguments on December 1st.4° Kessler
himself was sure that the FDA would lose,4 1 and he was right---on
33. See infra tbl.3 (noting losses and gains of tobacco stocks after various events);
see generally Roberts, A Dead Senator Tells No Lies, supra note 3. One might compare
the impact of Judge Russell's death to the impact of Senator Jackson's death. Id.
34. KESSLER, supra note 20, at 358.
35. Id.
36. In Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 367 U.S. 837 (1984), the
Supreme Court established that agency interpretations of statutes in the absence of clear
congressional intent would be accepted so long as they were reasonable.
37. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 161 F.3d 764
(4th Cir. 1998), aff d, 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
38. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000).
39. The Wall Street Journal ran a story that options traders were betting that the
Supreme Court would deny cert and thus provide a boon to tobacco stocks. Steven M.
Sears, Abstract, Options Traders Bet High Court Will Decide Against Reviewing
Tobacco Ruling on FDA, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1999, at C24. The decision to grant cert
was thus a clear surprise and a potential blow to both sets of stocks.
40. FDA. v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120.
41. KESSLER, supra note 20, at 379.
March 21, 2000, the Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision and
ruled against the FDA.42
IV. IDEALIZED MODEL AND PREDICTIONS
To test how the various actors in the above timeline influenced public
policy we present a simple spatial model in Figure 1 that is designed to
capture the key strategic considerations between actors. From the
idealized model we derive predictions that correspond to each of the
following possibilities: congressional dominance, executive dominance,
Supreme Court dominance and federal court dominance. Before we
offer our predictions, however, we describe the model and how it relates
to the timeline laid out above.
FIGURE 1: GAME BETWEEN CONGRESS, EXECUTIVE AND COURTS
More RegulationLess Regulation
SQ1994 SQ1997 SQ1995
Senate House Judge Osteen President and
FDA
Appeals Court and
Supreme Court
In the above idealized game, the Senate, the House, the executive
branch (President and FDA), and the various court actors are modeled as
having policy preferences over the amount of regulation of tobacco
production and advertising.4 3 The House and Senate preferred the policy
in place at time SQ1994, but when the FDA issued its intent to regulate
tobacco and advertising it moved policy to SQ1995, which involved
regulation of tobacco advertising and production/sales. In this case,
Congress could not, by itself, move policy back to SQ1994 because the
42. FDA. v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120
43. This simple model is borrowed from Eskridge and Ferejohn, and Spiller and
Gely and assumes: 1) information is complete, in that the preferences of the players, the
structure of the game, and the rationality of the actors are all common knowledge, 2)
players perfectly anticipate the future course of play, 3) that no one is able to commit to
future courses of action, 4) and that all the actors in the model prefer that their decisions
not be overturned. See Eskridge, supra note 18; Gely, supra note 18.
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President would veto such a move. However, Judge Osteen ruled that
the FDA cannot regulate advertising but can regulate tobacco, which
effectively moved the status quo to SQt+1. The status quo created by Judge
Osteen is marginally closer to the ideal points of the House and Senate
than SQ1995, but the executive branch still preferred SQ 1997 to SQ1994,
because such a policy is closer to its ideal policy than Congress' policy
would be. Absent any further court action the status quo would have
remained at this point.
However, when the Fourth Circuit and then later the Supreme Court
ruled that the FDA does not have the authority to regulate tobacco, the
status quo essentially returned to 8Q1994, which is the policy preferred by
Congress. The return of policy to this point marks the end of this game
between Congress, the Executive and the Courts, as neither the FDA nor
the President can now move policy from SQ1994 as there is no such move
that would make the House and Senate better off.
In general, when policy is near the President's ideal location, the
House and Senate will be irrelevant because they cannot move policy
away from the President. The courts have the ability to move policy
along the regulatory dimension without the consent of Congress or the
executive.44 As a result of the inability of Congress to act independently,
either the President/FDA or courts will be the decisive players in the
above game.
Our model does not imply that the Supreme Court is the only relevant
judicial actor. In this model the district and appeals courts are both
assumed to have their own policy preferences, and the decisions they
make are assumed to have policy impact. As our model makes clear,
each time a court acts, it affects the status quo, which then empowers
either Congress or the President, and this therefore makes the courts
powerful players in the game.
From the above model we derive predictions for the four possible
models of policy making-congressional dominance, presidential and
FDA dominance, Supreme Court dominance, and courts as decisive
player. The predictions are specified in Part VI.A.
V. RESEARCH DESIGN
An event study, rather than focusing on direct policy measures, tests
44. Robert B. Horowitz, Judicial Review of Regulatory Decisions: The Changing
Criteria, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 133, 133-69 (1994).
the impact of an event by showing significant changes in relevant stock
values immediately following the event and ruling out alternative
causes. By focusing on firms whose profits will be affected by the
policy changes at stake in a court case, we can use event studies to test
the impact of judicial decisions on policy.
We can summarize our argument as follows:
1. Court decisions have a significant and independent
impact within public policy making.
2. Public policy affects the profits of firms.
Therefore, court decisions affect the profits of firms.
3. Stock values represent expected future profits (the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis).
Therefore, court decisions affect stock values.
Therefore, changes in stock values following court
decisions demonstrate an effect on policy.
Our argument rests on the links between court decisions and policy,
between policy and the profits of firms, and between profits and stock
prices-and thus between court decisions and stock prices. The first link
is the hypothesis we test, that judges were decisive actors in the policy
making process. The null hypothesis would be that courts did not have a
true impact in the policy making process, that Congress would have
blocked policy change anyway, making the courts' decisions irrelevant
(although apparently causal).
The policy-profits link is the argument that public policy affects the
profits of firm, by affecting supply and demand, production and
consumption, and the "rules of the game." (Our research design implicitly
tests this link as well.) Given this, our hypothesis implies that court
decisions that meaningfully affect public policy will affect the profits of
firms associated with that area of policy. Specifically, it implies that if
court decisions were decisive over tobacco regulatory policy, then court
decisions affect the expected profitability of tobacco and tobacco-
advertising firms.
The profits-prices link is actually the Efficient Markets Hypothesis
(EMH)-that a stock price reflects all relevant and available information
as to future profits for that stock, given the decisions of well-informed
and rational market traders.45 Restated, a stock price represents the
45. Different strengths of this hypothesis exist. Event studies only assume relative
market efficiency, not absolute efficiency (whether the market as a whole is overpriced
or underpriced).
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current value of the expected stream of future profits.46 The EMH is
standard in the finance and economics literature.47 Given that policy
changes will affect future profits, then the EMH means that policy
changes (current or future) will affect current prices. The change in
current prices serves as a proxy for the expected change in expected
profits, and the change in expected profits serves as a proxy for policy
change.48 Combining this with our hypothesis yields the inference that,
if court decisions affect policy, even probabilistically, they will affect
current prices. If they do not affect policy, then they should not affect
current prices.
To accept this approach one must believe that, in the aggregate, market
traders use publicly available information to make unbiased (though not
perfect) predictions about the effects of policy change on profits and that
they take action (buy or sell) on this basis. They have very strong
financial incentives to do. Under the EMH, "the market" may make mistakes,
but it may not systematically do so. So long as the market is not
systematically biased, then event study tests are valid. Why should we
study the decisions of market traders? Our answer is that market traders
46. One might think to use declared profits directly. Unfortunately, these are not
very good indicators of true performance, not least of which because the are highly
manipulable, at least in the short run, by the firms themselves. Stock prices, on the other
hand, are far less manipulable and are publicly available. See Abigail McWilliams &
Donald Siegel, Event Studies in Management Research: Theoretical and Empirical
Issues, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 626 (1997).
47. See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, Volatility Tests and Efficient Markets: A Review
Essay, 27 MONETARY ECON. 463 (1991); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1971); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient
Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991); Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous
Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95 (1979); J. S. Jordan, On the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis, 51 ECONOMETRICA 1325 (1983); A. Craig MacKinlay,
Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 13 (1997).
48. Direct measurement of ultimate policy effects might have the advantage of
eliminating the need for a proxy for policy such as profits (greater construct validity).
The tradeoff is the passage of time necessary for the observation of policy outcomes,
which creates problems of inference (history threats), given that other politically relevant
events might have occurred in the interim. Rosenberg seems to suggest that the passage
of time is a virtue for his case studies: "Each movement spans a sufficient length of time
to allow for variance. Covering decades, the debate over these issues has been affected
by political, social, and economic variables." ROSENBERG, supra note 11, at 4. Passage
of time might be a virtue for tracking policy changes but not for isolating the causes of
those changes.
are "voters on steroids"-they are everything we want the ideal voter to
be, with powerful incentives to be informed and behave rationally.49
Given the EMH, prices will change as soon as expectations change as
to future profits, and thus as soon as expectations change as to future
policy. When new information as to future policy and profits is revealed,
market traders quickly update their beliefs about future profits and their
resulting trading behavior updates the stock price accordingly. While media
coverage of the stock market might suggest otherwise, it is simply false
that all news affects the market-both economic theory and evidence
come down firmly as showing that only meaningful news does so.
To the extent that future events are predictable or expected, their
impact will already be included in stock prices, which can make it
difficult to identify the impact of events. Price changes will only occur
with respect to deviations from market expectations. This implies that
only surprising events-events which reveal new information about
policy and profits-can be tested. This also implies that the significance
of events can only be measured using changes in stock prices, not the
absolute levels thereof.50 (To be clear, surprise is not enough: to affect
prices, the event or outcome has to have the power to affect profits.)
49. The reactions of the stock market are thus at least as deserving of our attention
as public opinion polls, wherein the incentives for obtaining information and behaving
rationally are minimal. Market traders cannot afford to be consistently wrong. To be
clear, we are not arguing that market traders individually can do better than political
scientists at understanding or predicting the aggregate impact of judicial decisions.
Rather, we argue that market traders and industry experts are narrow, but deep experts,
specializing in how events will affect the profits of a specific firm (or perhaps an
industry) and making use of all information available to them. It is the aggregation of
very large numbers of these individual narrowly expert reactions that should lead to
reliable estimates of impact. There are some very good examples of investors correctly
predicting political events and their consequences. See Gilligan & Krehbiel, supra note
1; Complex Rules and Congressional Outcomes: A Study of Energy Tax Legislation, 50
J. of Politics 625-54; Roberts, Redistiibutive Consequences, supra note 1; G. William
Schwert, Using Financial Data to Measure the Effects of Regulation, 24 J.L. & ECON.
121, 131 (1981).
50. A frequently asked question: What if the prices change after an event but then
rebound? Assuming no other events occur or information is revealed in the meantime,
then the answer is that such a pattern would be a violation of the EMH, as prices would
not be unbiased predictors of future profits. If investors routinely overreact to events
(judicial decisions), or if prices always correct for initial reactions, then even marginally
clever traders could make a large profit simply by buying or selling in opposition to
these trends (skeptics are invited to try this following judicial decisions-using their own
money, of course). Furthermore, we control for trends over time statistically using a
model of the market. If events always lead to reactions and corrections, then the
variance of abnormal returns will be high and we should not find significant results.
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A final implication of the EMH is that to test the impact of an event,
one must identify not so much the historical date on which an event
occurred, but rather the timeframe of the release of the information that
is relevant for future profits-the event window. If this occurs very
gradually, the event window would have to be large, such that the impact
of the event of interest might be drowned out by the noise of other
events. Event windows "should be long enough to capture the
significant effect of the event, but short enough to exclude confounding
effects."51  That is, since event studies do not specify causal chains,
alternative causalities must be completely ruled out. There must be no
confounding events-other (surprising) events that might have affected
prices at the same exact time as the event of interest.
52
Putting all this together, we can only test an event if it reveals new
information, if the timing of the release of this information (the event
window) can be identified and isolated, and if this window is not too
prolonged. Given these requirements and the nature of the judicial
process, judicial decisions are strong candidates for event studies
(perhaps even more than many subjects of such studies).53 Judicial
decisions have clear, short event windows: the judges' deliberations are
private, the decisions themselves are kept secret until officially
announced (leaks are almost unheard of), and the decision dates are part
51. McWilliams & Siegel, supra note 46, at 636. McWilliams and Siegel consider
event window size "possibly the most crucial research design issue" and argue that it is
hard to reconcile the market efficiency assumption itself with long event windows. Id.
They note that short windows have been shown to be sufficient for capturing impact. Id.
Lengthy event windows (some use event windows many years in length) would imply
that either that the market was incredibly slow at incorporating information or that
information was released incredibly slowly. The longer the event window is, of course,
the harder it will be to control for confounding events and the more noise in the sample.
52. Should such events occur outside the event window but during the sample
period, they will not bias the results, though they may inflate the standard errors. Adding
controls for other important events during the estimation period does indeed (trivially)
reduce the standard errors in our tests.
53. We thus disagree with the comment that "judicial decisions are not 'events'
except to the litigants for whom a decision affects a wealth transfer." Sanjai Bhagat &
Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II, Empirical Studies of Corporate
Law 12 (Yale International Center for Finance, Working Paper No. 00-33; Yale Law
School Program for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, Research Paper No.
260, 2001) (on file with author). First, this is a rather large exception, particularly where
the litigants are major political actors with stages in the billions of dollars. Second, the
implications of judicial decisions often reach far beyond those present in the courtroom
itself.
of the public record. While the decision itself is a nearly instantaneous
event, the case as a whole percolates over a longer period of time-
allowing "the market" the time to explore the implications of the
possible decisions and then quickly react when the result is clear. The
reaction is nearly instantaneous. The analysis and planning need not be.
If judicial decisions decisively affect policy and are surprising, then
they should affect stock prices. Finding a significant effect following a
decision implies both surprise and impact; finding no significant effect
implies either that surprise was lacking (any effects were already
incorporated into prices) or that there was no impact (the event did not
affect future profits)-but not necessarily both. Thus, the event study
methodology only captures the lower bound of policy effects, and the
results may very well understate these effects.
The general event study design is not controversial. We add only the
hypothesis on the power of court decisions, so that the final implication-that
surprising decisions produce market reactions in the predicted
direction-allows for a clean test of our hypothesis. Since event study
tests are unclouded by the impact of both prior and subsequent events,
we can isolate the specific impact of judicial decisions to a far greater
degree of confidence than other approaches.
To put all this in the context of our tobacco case study, consider the
situation faced by market traders as the regulatory battle developed.
Future tobacco-related profits would certainly be affected by the degree
to which the FDA would be allowed to regulate tobacco products. The
market's baseline predictions are incorporated into current prices at the
start. A trader must keep a running tally of the probability that regulatory
changes will be made and her profits affected: buying (selling) a tobacco
stock is a bet that regulation will not go through (will go through). If an
event is relevant to this probability, and thus to expected profits, she will
update her tally and trade accordingly-which in the aggregate will
affect current stock prices.
If judicial decisions are irrelevant for this calculus, if courts lack
independent policymaking capacity, if congressional actions will trump
all, then judicial decisions reveal no information about future policy or
profits. A rational market trader will ignore the courts and concentrate
on Congress. Court decisions, no matter how "shocking," would not affect
tobacco prices. If, on the other hand, court decisions can significantly
and independently affect tobacco regulatory policy, if judges have the
potential to be decisive players in the policymaking game, then judicial
decisions are relevant for future profits, and market traders (at least in
the aggregate) must act accordingly. As judicial decisions resolve
residual uncertainty as to future tobacco policy, prices will change in a
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predictable fashion. Though Hamilton's analysis portrayed the courts as
having neither the power of the purse nor the sword, we use the power
over the purse to demonstrate the power of the sword.
A. The Statistical Model
While there are some variations between statistical models used to
conduct event studies, the basic approach remains the same. There is a
"normal" (expected) rate of return (change in total value)5 4 to a stock
based on 1) the movement of the market as a whole, 2) the sensitivity of
this stock to the market as a whole, and 3) the market-independent rate
of return for that stock. This defines the standard "market model."55
The "abnormal" return is the difference between the normal return we
would expect on the basis of the market model and the return we
actually observe.56 (See, for example, Figure 1, showing the normal and
abnormal returns surrounding the district court decisions.) The central
question is whether the abnormal return is significantly different from
zero in the predicted direction. Given that we are interested in a set of
stocks, the question is whether there is a significant pattern of such
abnormal returns.
We use a generalized least squares (GLS) approach, as this has clear
advantages for inference in event studies.57 The multivariate GLS
54. More precisely, the rate of return is the change in the total value of an
investment in a security, here over the period of one day, expressed as a percentage of
the total amount invested.
55. One alternative is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), but models such
as this have not been shown to perform better than the market model and are not
recommended by the event study literature. MacKinlay, supra note 47, at 19. The
market model is "the best available model" for event studies. McWilliams & Siegal,
supra note 46, at 636.
56. Consider an analogy to an electoral study with a "normal vote," the vote we
predict based on prior voting patterns and sensitivity to national vote swings, and an
"abnormal vote," the difference from the observed vote to the expected vote. See
Angbazo & Narayanan, supra note 1, at 622; Paul H. Maltesta, Measuring Abnormal
Performance: The Event Parameter Approach Using Joint Generalized Least Squares,
21 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 27, 35 (1986); McWilliams & Segal, supra note 46.
57. The GLS approach explicitly takes into account the cross-sectional correlation
of the returns of related firms. The non-contemporaneous covariances must be zero, but
the contemporaneous covariances can be nonzero. The disturbances are assumed to be
independent and identically distributed within each firm, but can vary across firms
(heteroscedasticity). GLS also makes more efficient use of the data and allows for more
powerful hypothesis testing.
regression model is
where/Ri, = rate of return58 for firm i on day t (i = 1, 2,... N)
Rmt - rate of return for the market index on day t
18i0 =market-independent rate of return on firm i
A = sensitivity of firm i's rate of return to changes in the
market's rate of return
flik= sensitivity of firm i's rate of return to event k (k = 1,
2,.. ., K)
D = dummy variable only equal to one if event k occurred
on day t
= error term (assumed normally distributed and serially
independent) for firm i on day t
On the left is the observed rate of return. On the right, the first and
second terms constitute the market model, and the dummy variable
interaction captures the abnormal return (the impact of the event). Each
firm has its own impact coefficient.
Were we interested in only one particular firm, we could simply test
its impact coefficient (size and magnitude), but our focus is on a set of
related stocks. There are two standard ways to test the impact of an
event on a set of stocks, focusing on joint impact and aggregate impact.
Each is sensitive to somewhat different patterns of impact, and are best
used in conjunction with each other.59
The joint impact hypothesis is that the event had a significant impact
on each individual firm in the sample. This test is non-directional,
however, and could be satisfied by large abnormal returns in the
"wrong" direction. A directional test of overall impact is the aggregate
impact hypothesis, testing whether the net abnormal return summed over
the stocks in the sample is significantly different from zero and in the
58. 1?,, =((p(t).f(t)+d(t))/p(t'))-l, where p(t) is the last sale price at time t,
f(t) is the factor to adjust the price at (so that the current and previous prices are
adjusted to account for any "splits"-increases in the number of outstanding shares
maintaining proportional equity among shareholders), d(t) is the dividend amount,
p(t') is the last sale price at the time of the last available price before t.
59. An additional test, a portfolio test (which considers an equally-weighted
portfolio of the relevant stocks), yields almost exactly the same results.
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predicted direction. Abnormal returns in the "wrong" direction will
cancel out those in the "right" direction. Aggregate impact tests the sum
of the individual impact coefficients, while the joint test aggregates the
set of individual test results into one F-test. While the joint test is better
at capturing the breadth of impact across the set of stocks, the aggregate
test better captures the magnitude of the impact (while also incorporating
the direction of the abnormal returns).
We test these hypotheses on appropriate sets of tobacco and
advertising stocks. We now turn to the definition of these stocks and our
data.
VI. PREDICTIONS, DATA, AND RESULTS
A. Events and Predictions
The tobacco timeline we sketched in Part III suggests a number of key
events to study along the road to the Supreme Court's final blow to the
FDA's attempts to regulate tobacco. We look at the effects of seven of
these on stock returns, concentrating, of course, on those that were
surprising. For each, we make a pair of directional predictions and rule
out confounding events. To define the appropriate event windows and to
rule out confounding events, we performed Lexis searches around the
event dates for articles or reports mentioning tobacco, the FDA, or
advertising. 60 We are confident that none of our inferences are undercut
by confounding events.
In the list below, we indicate the events we study as well as our
(positive or negative) predictions for impact (based on the previous
discussion of the tobacco regulatory battle and the idealized game
between the Executive, Congress, and the courts):
60. We do not cite individually the multitudes of news articles on tobacco
available for each event. There is generally no industry-wide news about advertising.
CONGRESSIONAL EXECUTIVE SUPREME COURT
DOMINANCE 6 1  DOMINANCE6 2  COURT SYSTEM
DOMINANCE DOMINANCE
EVENT PREDICTIONS FOR TOBACCO/ADVERTISING
1. FDA notice -/- -/- 0/0 0/0
2. District -/- 0/0 0/0 -/-
court decision
3. Death of 0/0 0/0 0/0 -/-
Judge Russell
4. Fourth +/+ 0/0 0/0 +/+
Circuit panel
reverses
5. En banc 0/0 0/0 0/0 +/+
review denied
6. Supreme 0/0 0/0 -/-
Court grants
cert
7. Supreme 0/0 0/0 +/+ +/+
Court affirms
Our event windows are single days for the tests on the tobacco stocks
and two days for advertising stocks (given the less direct connection to
the court decisions). We are focusing on the instantaneous reactions of
the market to news as to policy changes. The chance that there exist
unnoticed confounding events on these exact days is vanishingly small.
Furthermore, our predictions vary in sign by event and by stock.
The key events-those that were clearly surprising and thus should
have strongly affected calculations of the probability that tobacco
regulation would stand-are the FDA notice, the district court decision,
the death of Judge Russell, and the denial of en banc review (while we
consider these the key tests, we present the results for all seven events).
The reversal by the Second Circuit court panel was not much of a surprise
given the long path from the original panel hearing to the replacement of
Judge Russell to the subsequent oral arguments. Furthermore, close
61. Congressional dominance can only be tested under unified government. Under
divided government, as in this case, Congress cannot change the status quo and the
courts act to reestablish the status quo.
62. Executive dominance implies that Congress cannot overturn decisions of these
actors.
[Vol. 15: 163, 2006] Courts, Congress, and Public Policy, Part I
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES
attention to the Supreme Court over the period preceding its decision
revealed that it would likely affirm the circuit court, and it did. It was
somewhat surprising that it granted certiorari, however.
B. Data
We focus primarily on tobacco stocks and secondarily on advertising
stocks. We also look more closely at the five major tobacco
companies.63 The market's rate of return is taken from the standard
source, the Center for Research in Securities Prices' (CRSP) 64 equally-
weighted index of all NYSE/AMEX stocks on the given day.65 The list
of tobacco and advertising stocks comes from the U.S. Department of
Labor's Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, with minor
exceptions. 66 Tables IA and 1B show which stocks were included for
63. These are Phillip Morris, British American Tobacco, R.J. Reynolds, Lorillard,
and Liggett.
64. This is the standard data; citations to the CRSP data number in the thousands.
65. While it is possible to use an index with size-weighted returns with little
change in the results, the equally-weighted index is the recommended choice. See
Stephen Brown & Jerome B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event
Studies, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1985); Chuck C. Y. Kwok & LeRoy D. Brooks, Examining
Event Study Methodologies in Foreign Exchange Markets, 21 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 189,
219 (1990). When the sample contains firms of only one size (which is not the case
here), the equally-weighted index can bias against finding significant results using t-
tests. See S. P. Kothari & Charles E. Wasley, Measuring Security Price Performance in
Size-Clustered Samples, 64 ACCT. REv. 228, 247 (1989); G. William Schwert, Size and
Stock Returns and Other Empirical Regularities, 12 J. FIN. ECoN. 3 (1989).
66. First, we selected all of the stocks from the CRSP database with "tobacco" SIC
codes (those with "tobacco" in the description) that had complete trading data for at least
one of our event windows. This yielded 16 stocks from major group 21 (Tobacco
Products), three stocks with SIC code 5159 (Farm-product raw materials) that were
tobacco-related, and one stock with SIC code 5194 (Tobacco and Tobacco Products).
(The two exceptions are Loews Corp., whose subsidiary is Lorillard, and Vector Group,
whose subsidiary, is Liggett. Because both Lorillard and Liggett are named in Beahm v.
FDA and Brown & Williamson v. FDA, and are well known to be two of the major
tobacco companies in the U.S., we searched out and added each of these specifically.
They were not caught in our initial SIC sweep given their status as holding companies
with diverse subsidiaries. The 26 advertising stocks were chosen in similar fashion
(code 731 is Advertising). We then omitted two-Clear Channel and Westwood-as
tobacco advertising is not allowed on television or radio. Note that Coyne Beahm,
despite being a named party to the district court case, is not in the CRSP data, as it is a
partnership, not a publicly held firm. For an overview and listing of SIC codes, see U.S.
Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., available at http://www.osha.
gov/pls/imis/sicsearch.html.
which windows (stocks were only included in a given window if they
existed during the year 67 surrounding the event).
C. Results
Tables 2A and 2B present, respectively, the tobacco and advertising
results. Table 3 presents the total gains and losses to the market
capitalization on the event days (not controlling for the normal returns).
We give results for the full sets of stocks as well as for the five biggest
tobacco companies separately. 68
All effects for all events were in the predicted directions, though not
equally significant. Overall, the key results for both tobacco and
advertising stocks were the FDA notice, the district court ruling, the
death of Judge Russell, and the en banc denial (events 1, 2, 3, and 5).
Not surprisingly, the advertising stocks, none of which are purely
tobacco driven, show a lesser effect than the tobacco stocks themselves,
even with longer event windows. In context, the most important result is
the dramatic impact of the most surprising event in our sample, the
district court decision upholding tobacco regulation.
1. Event 1: FDA Notice
The 2% loss to the market cap following the FDA notice was
significant. We show a negative impact on the set of tobacco stocks in
the aggregate test, with a larger and more significant impact on the
major tobacco companies using either test.69  The effect on the
advertising stocks is weaker.
67. This period ran from either January to December or July to June depending on
which span best centered the event. The results should be robust so long as the span is
representative of the variances of the time series. Events 4 and 5 fall in the same time
period and are run in the same regression (results are unchanged if they are run
individually); other events are run individually.
68. We also confirmed that our major results were not driven by outliers using a
non-parametric test of sign percentages. See Angbazo & Narayanan, supra note 1, at
623-34; MacKinlay, supra note 47, at 32; McWilliams, supra note 46, at 635. This tests
whether the proportion of positive to negative abnormal returns exceeds that to be
expected from the market model. If the event truly has no effect, then on average half
the firms should have positive abnormal returns and half negative. The non-parametric
test statistic is given by (G - pN)/ p) , where G is the number of negative sample
coefficients, N is the total number of sample coefficients, and p is the probability of a
negative estimate under the null hypothesis (.05).
69. Note that the FDA's proposals meant that the information they used to
determine the status of nicotine as a drug would be released and thus provide useful
evidence for the numerous law suits filed against the industry. Thus, we are perhaps
over-estimating the effects of the FDA's proposed rule-making itself on asset values.
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2. Event 2: The District Court Decision
Figure 1 shows the abnormal returns averaged over the big five
tobacco companies around the district court ruling (recall that the market
cap for the entire industry dropped six billion dollars). The district court
decision has a clearly significant (negative) effect regardless of the test
used. (We present the full set of GLS coefficients used to generate these
tests in Table 4.70) The advertising stocks, meanwhile, show a
significant positive effect (as predicted).
3. Event 3: Judge Russell Dies
The impact of Judge Russell's death is statistically weaker than the
results above. 88% of the tobacco stocks (and all of the five major
tobacco stocks) dropped on the event day. The joint impact on the
advertising stocks is significant.
4. Event 4: The Fourth Circuit Reverses
No significant surprises are shown.
5. Event 5: The Fourth Circuit Denies En Banc Review
Regardless of the test used, the en banc denial had a significant
positive effect (the market capitalization climbed $3.5 billion, or
2.2%)-the strongest (both joint tests and the aggregate test on the five
main tobacco stocks) are significant at .001. The joint test for the
advertising stocks shows a significant effect at .03.
6. Event 6: The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari
There is a significant result for the joint impacts on the five main
tobacco stocks and on the advertising stocks.
70. We also ran an ordinary least squares regression to explain the sizes of the
abnormal returns of the tobacco stocks, predicting correctly that being one of the "big
five" and being a pure tobacco company (as compared to a conglomerate) would mean a
larger impact due to the event. We had the necessary data for only 12 firms. The
respective coefficients (p-values in parentheses) for "big five" and "pure tobacco"
respectively were -.0248 (.03) and -.0287 (.05), with a constant of .0000 (.5).
7. Event 7: The Supreme Court Affirms
The joint tests show significant effects on the tobacco stocks.
VII. DISCUSSION
If the Efficient Markets Hypothesis is accepted, if the event windows
are properly designed, and if confounding events are ruled out, then the
observed reactions of market traders represent anticipated policy effects
due to court decisions, which must in equilibrium represent unbiased
predictions of actual policy effects. What we would emphasize in the
results is that we have tested a complex pattern of predictions (positive
for some stocks and negative for others) and many of them yield highly
significant results.7 Our conclusions do not rest on any one test, but
rather a pattern of results, making the overarching test for judicial impact
a powerful one.7" On the other hand, even if the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis is not accepted in full, despite the evidence for it, our results
still demonstrate the rather substantial impact of individual judges over
stock prices.
The test results suggest the following. The sharp turnaround in FDA
policy over tobacco jurisdiction did come as a shock, despite the
warning signs that this was in the works. Until the actual notice was
given, there was always the chance that the Clinton administration or
Congress would stop the FDA. Even once the decision was made, it was
likely the courts would block the FDA, which made Judge Osteen's
decision a shock. The test results suggest the power of even a lone
district court judge to affect public policy, as Judge Osteen's decision
clearly had the potential to be decisive as to the future of tobacco
regulation. The information revealed over the next few months would
reduce the probability of such regulation considerably. The tobacco
companies might have had reasonable hopes of winning on appeal, but
such hopes would be restrained by the fear that the Supreme Court's
rules for statutory interpretation might justify the FDA's decision.
Meanwhile, the chance that advertising regulation would be reinstated
was much smaller than the chances that tobacco regulation would go
through. The reversal by the appellate panel gave confidence to tobacco
investors, while not coming as a particular shock given the composition
of the panel and the circuit as a whole. The en banc denial gave a
71. Thus, our results could not be explained by the aphorism that, to the stock
market, "all news is bad."
72. Trochim, supra note 2.
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semblance of finality to the verdict. At this point, the granting of certiorari
by the Supreme Court was somewhat of a surprise to tobacco investors,
given that the Court tends to reverse far more decisions than it affirms.
The Supreme Court's ultimate decision to affirm was only the final nail
in the FDA's regulatory coffin (and not too surprising at the time of the
final decisions itself).
VIII. CONCLUSION
The simple spatial model we introduced in Part IV provided us with a
way to test a variety of theories about policymaking. Our primary
conclusion is that the courts did wield decisive power over tobacco
regulation and their decisions had a major impact on the probability that
tobacco would ultimately be regulated by the FDA. Investors were
clearly not confident that Congress would block the FDA, that the FDA
would cave in, or that President Clinton would call the FDA off-so that
when the courts acted, their decisions significantly changed the
policymaking calculus. In fact, our results show that the lower bound on
the impact of the district court decision is greater than that of any other
event in our sample. Hamilton may be right that the judicial branch
lacks force and will, having merely "judgment"-but it would be foolish
to dismiss such judgments when $6 billion dollars can go up in smoke in
a single day due to the decision of a single district court judge. Whether
or not the judiciary is the least dangerous branch, it is indeed a
"dangerous" branch within the policymaking process. Our results also
suggest that the event study method is a viable method for sorting out
causality and judicial impact more broadly.
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HYPOTHESIS TESTS FOR TOBACCO STOCKS
ALL THE FIVE MAJOR
TOBACCO STOCKS TOBACCO STOCKS
Event Aggregate Joint Aggregate Joint
Impact Impact Impact Impact
1. FDA Notice -1.51 * 12.98 -1.84** 8.40*
(.07) (.15) (.03) (.07)
2. District Court -1.58* 27.37** -2.10** 19.30***
Decision (.06) (.03) (.02) (.01)
3. Judge Russell Dies -1.32* 6.17 -0.84 1.61
(.09) (.99) (.20) (.45)
4. 4th Circuit Reverses .21 13.22 0.28 1.75
(.42) (.72) (0.39) (.88)
5. En Bane Denied 1.49* 30.56*** 2.93*** 18.6***
(.07) (.01) (.01) (.01)
6. Supreme Court -0.95 18.54 -0.69 9.39**
Grants Cert (.17) (.14) (.24) (.05)
7. Supreme Court 0.62 23.41** 0.16 14.17**
Affirms (.26) (.05) (.48) (.01)
* significant at 10%level ** significant at 5% level ***significant at 1% level.
Notes: Key surprising events are in bold. The coefficients for the aggregate test are the z-
stats and for the joint test are the )?-values. The p-values in parenthesis (one-tailed for the
directional predictions of the aggregate tests and two-tailed for the joint tests). All event
windows are single days.
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TABLE 2B: HYPOTHESIS TESTS FOR ADVERTISING STOCKS
Event Aggregate Joint
Impact Impact
1. FDA Notice -0.59 8.85
(0.28) (.88)
2. Dist Court Decision 2.28*** 43.72***
(.01) (.001)
3. Judge Russell Dies -0.38 83.77***
(.35) (.01)
4. 4 th Circuit Reverses .10 11.35
(.46) (.94)
5. En Banc Denied .28 34.88**
(.38) (.03)
6. Sup Court Grants Cert -1.00 31.61*
(.16) (.07)
7. Sup Court Affirms .10 26.80
(.46) (.47)
* significant at 10%level ** significant at 5% level ***significant at
1% level
Notes: Key surprising events are in bold. The coefficients for the
aggregate test are the z-stats and for the joint test is the X2-values. The
p-values in parenthesis (one-tailed for the directional predictions of the
aggregate tests and two-tailed for the joint tests). The event window for
event 1 goes from five trading days before the event to one day after.
The event window for event 2 goes from the day of the event to 4 days
after. Other event windows are single days. Two stocks were dropped
for event I given missing data.
TABLE 3: LOSSES AND GAINS OF TOBACCO STOCKS
Event DollarsA % of Market CapitalizationB
I. FDA Notice - $1,801,050,000 - 2.1%
2. Dist Court Decision - $6,134,796,000 - 4.7%
3. Judge Russell Dies -$1,810,155,000 -1.3%
5. En Banc Denied $3,550,530,000 2.2%
A Using all tobacco stocks included in the event window, as listed in Table IA, this is
calculated as [(number of shares outstanding on day t) x (price on day 1] - [(number of
shares outstanding on day t- 1) x (price on day t- 1)1, where t is the event day.
B This is calculated by dividing the figure in the Dollars column by the summed market
capitalization of the stocks in each event window.
[Vol. 15: 163,2006] Courts, Congress, and Public Policy, Part I
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES
TABLE 4: INDIVIDUAL GLS COEFFICIENTS FOR EVENT 2
(DISTRICT COURT RULING IN BEAHM V. FDA)
Firm Name Firm Constant Ai Firm Sensitivity A. Firm Event CoefficientIk
Philip Morris -0.0013 2.4709*** -0.0399**
(0.0013) (0.3205) (0.0201)
Loews Corp. -0.0009 2.0701*** -0.0071
(Lorillard) (0.0009) (0.2207) (0.0138)
Vector Group 0.0024 -0.5011 -0.0301
(Liggett) (0.0031) (0.7470) (0.0468)
RJ Reynolds -0.0009 2.1717*** -0.0774***
(0.0013) (0.3192) (0.0200)
British -0.0002 1.2901*** 0.0017
American (0.0011) (0.2656) (0.0166)
Tobacco
Standard 0.0009 0.5476 0.0013
Comm. Corp. (0.0018) (0.4348) (0.0272)
Dimon Inc. -0.0009 1.9086*** -0.0271 *
(0.0013) (0.3208) (0.0201)
Universal Corp. 0.0006 0.9261*** -0.0141
(0.0011) (0.2757) (0.0173)
Savia Sa De CV -0.0012 1.4209*** 0.0069
(0.0010) (0.2480) (0.0155)
UST Inc. -0.0018* 1.8330*** 0.0140
(0.0013) (0.3031) (0.0190)
Pacific 0.0007 1.7250*** -0.0028
Greystone Corp. (0.0015) (0.3713) (0.0233)
Caribbean Cigar -0.0030 0.4829 -0.0427
Co. (0.0026) (0.6282) (0.0393)
Consolidated 0.0000 1.0978*** -0.0126
Cigar Hldgs. (0.0014) (0.3359) (0.0210)
Swedish Match -0.0003 0.5813*** -0.0051
Co. (0.0009) (0.2074) (0.0130)
Amcon 0.0054 0.1052 -0.0049
Distributing (0.0058) (1.4087) (0.0882)
Wald - X2  434.70*** Observations 3795 (16 stocks x 253 days)
* Significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% (standard errors in parentheses).
FIGURE 1: EVENT 2
AVERAGED NORMAL AND ACTUAL RETURNS FOR
THE FIVE MAJOR TOBACCO COMPANIES AROUND
THE BEAHM V. FDA DISTRICT COURT RULING
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